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ABSTRACT

Results are reported of a study to determine how citizens come to know and like or dislike presidential candidates. The Republican elections of 1980 are analysed according to: how and when citizens are introduced to political candidates, what accounts for the dynamics of awareness and recognition of candidates, how and when citizens develop affective orientations toward political candidates, and what accounts for changes in how citizens evaluate candidates. The sample consisted of 8,000 New Jersey residents interviewed between October, 1979 and July, 1980. Participants were asked to recall names of candidates running for the presidential nomination, state candidate preference, and explain the most important reason for their support of the candidate. Results indicate that knowledge and opinion of presidential candidates is distributed in three layers of the public: attentive, peripheral, and inadvertent. Attentives, approximately one-third of the population, are already aware of the candidates when the media first devote attention to the campaign. Their knowledge about the candidate is not based on prominent coverage. The peripheral, about one-fifth of the population, become aware only after exposure to the intense coverage accompanying success in a campaign test. The inadvertents, one-third of the public, also depend on such coverage, but only to the extent that they recognize candidates names rather than become aware of them. Many citizens base their evaluations upon perceptions of the candidate's competitive strength rather than on personal qualities or ideological positions. (Author/KC)

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THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF VOTERS'
IMAGES OF CANDIDATES DURING PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

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Changes in the role of the mass public in the selection of presidential nominees since 1968 have been so great as to lead us to talk of the "old system" and the "new system." In the new system, voters in primaries directly select approximately three-fourths of convention delegates in both parties, compared to one-third in 1968. The voters in early primaries have considerable influence over those in the late primaries, both in the cues they give and in their role in the winnowing of large fields.

Further, a candidate emerging from obscurity to capture the nomination was virtually unheard of in the old system. Front-runners before the primaries also led after they were concluded, and in all cases between 1936 and 1968 received the nomination (Keech and Matthews, 1976:229). In 1972, however, front-runner Edmund Muskie failed in New Hampshire to meet the expectations which he and his staff had helped reporters to establish, (Arterton, 1978), and his campaign was mortally wounded. In 1976, Jimmy Carter demonstrated a method by which an unknown political entrepreneur could rise to the nomination in a few short months. In 1980, two slightly-better known men, George Bush and John Anderson, applied Carter's methods against a strong opponent and achieved considerable notoriety. Though neither captured the Republican nomination, both now stand to influence the election, one as the Vice-Presidential nominee, the other as a strong independent candidate.

An understanding of how citizens come to know and like--or dislike--candidates is essential to an evaluation of the new nominating process. Voters in primaries (and caucus-goers as well) have a direct voice in the selection of delegates, which with binding preferences at the convention is tantamount to selecting the nominee. Moreover, voters in the first contests exert strong influence upon candidates' campaign workers and financial supporters, on the media, and on the public at large (which may use the behavior of other voters to orient itself toward the candidates). The development of beliefs and opinions about political leaders has been a neglected area of research on public opinion and voting behavior; understandably so, given the costs and logistical difficulties associated with longitudinal research.

Knowledge of the dynamics of citizen learning about leaders would help to fill many theoretical gaps, particularly with respect to the effects of mass communication and role of the media in the electoral process. In addressing this void, this paper focusses upon two general sets of questions: (1) How and when are citizens introduced to political candidates, and what accounts for the dynamics of awareness and recognition of candidates? (2) How and when do citizens develop affective orientations toward political candidates, and what accounts for changes in how citizens evaluate

candidates? Based upon the experiences of 1972 and 1976, we have developed a set of expectations for 1980, described below. Although we gathered data on public responses to candidates for the nominations of both parties, only the Republican race provided the necessary elements for analysis: candidates who were virtually unknown before the process began and who subsequently became known and liked by appreciable numbers of citizens.

Recognition and Awareness. Intuitively, citizen knowledge of candidates, their activities and their attributes, is in some measure a function of the amount of information about these available to the public. However, any theory of the dynamics of salience in elections must also account for the motivations of the public. While there is some evidence of "passive learning" (Krugman and Hartley, 1970), those who are more interested simply get more information. Considerable recent research on the effects of mass media demonstrates the utility of considering variation in why individuals seek information and the uses to which that information is put (Swanson, 1979; Kippax and Murray, 1980; Blumler and Katz, 1974).

People differ considerably in both levels and types of political interest. Some constantly monitor the news media, others attend in episodic fashion, while still others ignore politics completely. Patterson's 1976 panel study found relatively small changes in the interest of citizens during the primaries. In one of his field sites, Erie, Pennsylvania, 22% of his respondents reported strong interest in February, rising only to 28% in April, and 26% in June. Los Angeles residents became more interested by June as Californians Reagan and Brown figured prominently in the campaign news (Patterson, 1980:68).

These findings lead to an important question: Given the serial configuration of the primaries, to what degree do interest, recognition and awareness of the candidates increase with the onset and progress of the campaign? While increases might be expected as a simple function of exposure-with-time, information costs in primary elections are quite high, given the large number of contingencies (Aldrich, 1980:81). It may well be that until the campaign comes to the front door, so to speak, few citizens are likely to expend special effort to learn about the candidates. A better understanding of the interactions among public interest, campaign events, and news coverage will help to explain whether candidates become known simply by staying in the race over a period of time or whether they must figure prominently in a well-covered event (e.g., by finishing first in a primary) for most citizens to notice them. Examination of the patterns of change in recognition and awareness of candidates, as well as the upper and lower limits for different candidates, should provide evidence with which a tentative model of these dynamics may be constructed.

To the extent that citizen interest in the campaign remains relatively constant, we may expect to find ordered and predictable changes in awareness and recognition of candidates, and in willingness to offer opinions about them. These changes should be associated in time with the prominent events of the campaign (those receiving headline status in newspapers and substantial attention on network TV news). Such changes should also reflect boundaries imposed by the underlying distribution of citizen interest.

In observing the trends in awareness and recognition of candidates through the series of primaries there are a number of questions we are concerned with:

- * Is there a general pattern of increase in awareness and recognition of active candidates as the campaign progresses, or is the pattern one of increases associated only with specific events of high salience in mass media?
- * Assuming that events boost awareness and recognition of candidates who figure prominently in those events, how large are these increases?
- * At different stages of the campaign, what are the upper and lower limits of recognition and awareness of candidates; particularly, what portion of the population responds to the first campaign news, and what portion remains inert throughout the campaign?
- * Do all active candidates (that is, candidates who remain in the race with at least a mathematical chance of success) attain the same level of public awareness and recognition; are such differences as may remain a function of the competitive positions of the candidates?
- * Do Democrats and Republicans differ in their levels of awareness and recognition of Republican candidates for the nomination? Do they differ in the nature of changes in awareness and recognition during the campaign?

Candidate Affect and Candidate Preference. What accounts for public affect for particular candidates? Is this ultimately a function of how "good" the candidate really is? Unfortunately, the evidence from 1972 and 1976 suggests that public affect has a life of its own, at least in the nomination period for new candidates. This is not to argue that citizen response is entirely divorced from reality, or that candidates can project any image they wish (or even that they can't). Instead, it suggests that for candidates who are poorly known, the dynamics of response of those who are not directly exposed through a campaign in their state depend far more on how they perform in the tests of the campaign than upon their characters, looks, or ideologies. Well-known candidates have

an advantage in salience but this confers little legitimacy upon them. Their ratings are much better grounded in the particular attributes of the candidate. But few citizens are able to rate newcomers. Those who do are remarkably positive in their evaluations. For example, in 1976 Jimmy Carter was rated favorably by 72% of those able to judge in February (based on about one-fourth of the public); Morris Udall received a 63% rating in the survey (based on about 10% of the public). Jerry Brown, whose favorable ratings in 1980 have been quite low, received a 59% favorable rating in April of 1976 when he first entered the race. (All data from CBS/NY Times polls.)

All candidates in 1976 experienced declines in the proportion of favorable impressions as the campaign progressed, except during periods when the candidate was successful in primaries. Even then, as more people came to know the candidate--and presumably as people who knew him came to know him better--favorable impressions rose only slightly or held steady. In the long run, all candidates ended up lower than where they began. This pattern, especially for the newcomers, suggests that citizens are generous with their affections in greeting new and unknown candidates. Much like new romance, the infatuation born of a candidate's unexpected early success obscures blemishes which may become apparent in the light of later publicity. The media may encourage the eventual decline by holding front runners to a higher standard than other candidates (Robinson 1980:43-44). Candidates who continue to do well in primaries will experience relatively minor declines, while those who are unsuccessful suffer losses in their attractiveness to the public. As Thomas Patterson argues, the information upon which citizen orientations toward candidates are based is so meager that the bulk of change cannot be explained by media hostility or the public's discovery of heretofore unseen warts on the character or philosophy of the candidates. Instead, changes are based upon that information which best penetrates to the public: who is successful and who is not. (Patterson, ch.11)

To identify "success" (whether actual victory, or a topping of journalistically-defined expectations) as the critical variable affecting changes in how favorable candidates are viewed is to assign meaning to the oft-used term "momentum." A candidate's success or failure in a particular contest will depend on many things specific to his efforts there, but after the first two or three significant contests of the campaign, the potential voters he faces will already possess important orientations toward him. If these opinions are low by virtue of failures (real, or interpreted as such by press) he has an uphill battle indeed. If impressions of candidates are first tied to perceptions of strength and efficacy of the candidate, important limits are placed upon the degree to which change can be induced through information about a candidate's character and ideology.

Such generalizations direct us to a number of specific questions to ask of our data for 1980:

- * To what extent are changes in the holding or favorable or unfavorable impressions of candidates, as opposed to being unwilling or unable to judge related to changes in knowledge of the candidates? That is, do changes in the propensity to hold an opinion parallel changes in awareness and recognition?
- * In what ways are impressions of candidates associated with the candidates successes and failures in the nominating process? Does this relationship vary from the beginning of the process to the end? Is "momentum" identifiable?
- * Is there a bandwagon effect, in which an apparent winner becomes the beneficiary of considerable public conversion to his side? Or is there a decline in approval once victory is certain, as individuals become more familiar with the candidate?
- * Do Democrats exhibit the same dynamics in response to Republican candidates as Republicans do?

Methods, Data and Setting

One of the reasons so little attention has been devoted to the process by which citizens form and develop opinions about candidates is that the necessary data are costly to collect. The information needed to study this question requires repeated measurements of a population, either as a panel study or series of cross-sectional surveys. The data to be presented in this paper come from a series of nine telephone interviews conducted with New Jersey residents. Approximately 8,000 people were interviewed between October, 1979 and July of 1980.

The data were collected by the Eagleton Poll, a research center of the Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University. Between October 1979 and July of 1980, questions pertaining to the presidential nominations were inserted on nine statewide surveys. Each survey was an independent probability sample of New Jersey residents, 18 years and older. The sampling procedures for each survey were identical. The sample size ranged from 806 to 1,134.

As many of the questions were "piggybacked" on ongoing research projects we had only minimal control over the timing of some of the surveys. Accordingly we occasionally found ourselves in the awkward position of being in the field on both sides of a significant primary. This circumstance led to an analytic quandry. While analyzing the data by waves gives confidence that observed changes from one survey to the next are real, and error calculable, there are problems of contamination with key study questions. It is considerably more difficult, for example, to investigate the consequence of winning the New Hampshire primary when two-thirds of the interviews on one wave are done before that primary and one-third after.

The other alternative, of treating the nine studies as one large sample of continuous interviewing, allows us to compare interviews completed before and after New Hampshire. The cost of this, of course, is the increased probability that observed differences are due to measurement artifact. Thus in this strategy there is the assumption, not fully warranted, that each day's interviewing is effectively random. While we have no evidence to suggest this is not true, neither can we produce evidence to the contrary. Whenever possible the data are analyzed as independent samples. However, when we were concerned about too much reactivity with the question under study we opted for the latter alternative, feeling it to be the lesser of the two evils.

While we were able to interview a large number of people, resource constraints limited the amount of time available, or number of questions that could be asked. Moreover, there were different constraints on different surveys. On all nine of the surveys we were able to measure knowledge of candidates, and

"imagery" in a crude fashion. We employed two tests of knowledge. The first measure was one of "awareness," where respondents were asked to "recall the names" of candidates running for the Republican and Democratic nominations. Interviewers recorded all names mentioned. The second indicator is one of "recognition." The list of candidates not volunteered in response to the open-ended question was read to respondents, who were asked to tell interviewers if they "had heard of" the names read. Both those aware of and those recognizing a candidate were asked, "Is your general impression of (name) favorable or unfavorable; or don't you have an opinion about him yet?" This serves as our measure of imagery.

On six of the surveys we were able to explore the cognitive underpinnings of candidate imagery more fully. Partisans¹ were asked which of the candidates running for their party's nomination they preferred. This was followed by an open-ended question asking, "What is the most important reason why you like (candidate named)?"²

The limited amount of time available for questions on the survey defines the scope of the study to a considerable extent. Our primary independent variable is "time." The paper is primarily descriptive, although we attempt to transcend our data upon occasion. By cutting the interviewing points around significant primaries our design allows us to observe changes, and to make inferences about events of the primary season that might be responsible for those changes.

In addition to being "convenient," the state of New Jersey offers a unique environment for studying the impact of television, and the impact of a primary campaign. New Jersey is one of only two states without an in-state commercial VHF station. Northern and Central New Jersey, where about three-quarters of the population resides, are served by television originating in New York; while Southern New Jersey is served by television from Philadelphia. Thus New Jersey's unique media environment offers a "natural control group," and partially allows us to overcome the "saturation effect"

¹Our measure of "partisans" includes those who clearly identified with one of the parties, and those who initially expressed no preference but said they "leaned" more towards one of the parties.

²Analysis of the open-ended imagery data is still in progress. They are not presented in this paper.

of television³ and to separate the effects of primary campaigns.

While network TV news reaching all areas of the state is constant, the local media environments (newspapers and local news) differ. While the New York primary offered little action on the Republican side, the Pennsylvania primary was a focal point of Bush efforts--designated by his campaign and journalistic organizations as a "must win" state. Local media coverage of the Pennsylvania primary was extensive, and both candidates invested in spot advertisements. Differences in attitudes of residents of north and south New Jersey may be attributed primarily to these local media conditions. National media content was constant for both areas, and as the primary was in Pennsylvania rather than New Jersey, candidates did not visit New Jersey nor was there any campaign activity in the state (canvassing, local party/group involvement) at this time. In sorting out the impact the media stimuli emanating from the Pennsylvania primary we may consider Southern New Jerseyans as a "treatment" group and Northern New Jerseyans as a "control group." It should be noted that we expect few differences. Interest in another state's primary is most likely constant, and, as noted, the national news is homogeneous. Facing these two obstacles, messages about the campaign in the local media would have to be strong indeed to produce independent effects.

³We are convinced that a principal reason for the "minimal effects" school of thought regarding the media (which is now only minimally accurate) concerns the dominance of television and sounds somewhat paradoxical. Few effects have been found because television has a pervasive effect -- a saturation effect. The medium is so dominant that everyone is touched by it, even that small percentage who do not own television receivers or watch much television. The frame of reference and common experiences provided by television reach us all either through direct exposure or indirect exposure through discussions with other people or the content of other media. A logical consequence of this is that studies attempting to attribute variation in attitudes or behavior to television exposure yield null findings as there is little or no variation in the population to be explained.

The most common mode of study has consisted of correlating the extent to which some effect is present with the extent of exposure to the medium. This investigative strategy is futile in this view, as the key difference is not how much exposure an individual had to the medium, but whether the individual was exposed at all (Zukin, 1977). Moreover, in an era of electronic campaigning, with 30 and 60 second "spot" advertisements interspersed in prime time entertainment programming, exposure may be considered universal (Patterson, 1980:59).

FINDINGS

The Development of Candidate Knowledge

Candidates for the Republican nomination clearly started from different positions in terms of how familiar they were to the citizenry. The race featured one well known candidate, Ronald Reagan; three candidates with whom the electorate had some familiarity, Howard Baker, Robert Dole and John Connally; and three candidates virtually unknown to the electorate before the campaign began, John Anderson, Phillip Crane and George Bush. Our expectation was that the public would learn about the candidates from events of the campaign and attending media coverage. Accordingly, the interviews were grouped by primary dates. Table 1 lists these groupings, displaying the dates, events and numbers of interviews completed.

TABLE 1: DATES, EVENTS, NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS


<u>Dates</u>	<u>Event</u>	(n)
Oct. 19-28, 1979	Pre-Iowa Caucus	(1134)
Feb. 14-26, 1980	Post-Iowa--Pre-New Hampshire	(1701)
Feb. 27-March 2	Post-New Hampshire--Pre Massachusetts	(764)
March 13-25	Post-Massachusetts--Pre-New York	(323)
April 6-21	Post-New York--Pre-Pennsylvania	(611)
April 22-May 1	Post Pennsylvania	(636)
May 1-15	Scattered small primaries	(817)
May 16-22	Pre-New Jersey, California, Ohio	(942)
June 23-July 14	Post-primaries--Pre-conventions	(840)

The measure of "awareness" employed is a stern one. Respondents were asked to spontaneously name the candidates running in response to an open-ended question. The patterns of awareness for the seven candidates are graphically depicted in figure 1.

The simplest explanation for these data is that "nothing succeeds like success." This is particularly true in the case of George Bush after Iowa and John Anderson after Massachusetts and Vermont. Awareness of Bush jumped from eight to 53 percent following his success in Iowa. While the pre-Iowa measurement was too far in advance of the caucuses to conclude the jump did not take place before the caucuses, the Anderson jump after the March 4 primaries strongly supports this inference. Moreover, had pre-caucus campaign activities been the chief source of information, larger jumps would have occurred in awareness of Baker, Connally and Anderson, who were also present at the televised candidates forum.

Reagan was the second beneficiary of the Iowa caucuses in terms of awareness. As the "frontrunner" when the campaign began, Bush's success was juxtaposed against his standard. As Reagan was already better known the jump in awareness of him as a presidential candidate

FIGURE 1: AWARENESS OF REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES
(All Respondents)



Oct 1979 Pre-Iowa Feb 14-26 Post-Iowa Pre-N.H. Feb 27-Mar 2 Post-N.H. Pre-Mass. Mar 13-25 Post-Mass. Pre-N.Y. Apr. 6-21 Post-N.Y. Pre-Penn. Apr 22-May 1 Post-Penn. May 1-16 scattered primaries May 16-22 Pre-N.J., Cal., Oh.

was not as substantial as that for Bush but about 25 percent more of the New Jersey electorate were aware of Reagan's candidacy after Iowa. Exposure from the Iowa campaign and results did little to move the remaining candidates across the public's threshold of awareness. Fourteen percent more were aware of Anderson after Iowa, and nine percent more were aware of Baker. Connally, Dole and Crane registered gains of less than three percent.

Even though finishing second to Bush in Massachusetts and to Reagan in Vermont, Anderson's unexpected strength⁴ commanded heavy media attention. The jump in public awareness of his candidacy was as dramatic as Bush's rise after New Hampshire. Awareness of Anderson more than doubled after these primaries, going from 22 to 51 percent.

A number of observations may be made from these data. First, of course, is the impact of a good showing in a primary. The attending media coverage propels a candidate into public consciousness in immediate and dramatic fashion. Second, the obverse is also true. Not doing well in primaries carries no benefits in public awareness. In one sense this is somewhat unexpected. Even weak candidates are reported in the box scores of the televised election specials and next day's newspapers. Yet awareness does not appear to grow over time from "just being in the news." Up until his Massachusetts breakthrough Anderson had only reached the awareness level of Baker and Connally--about one-quarter of the electorate. We might consider this group the "attentive electorate." We suspect a strong motivation to follow politics among this segment. Awareness comes from simple exposure to the information present; the splash of coverage coming with victory (however defined) is not necessary for this group to become aware.

The argument that there is an attentive public of about 25 percent (in New Jersey) cannot be pressed much farther on the data available. The candidates who did not break the threshold withdrew⁵, and there are too few cases of those remaining to sustain a convincing argument. However, some confirming evidence can be found in questions on three of the surveys asking respondents how interested they were in the primary elections. The evidence is that interest is not cumulative, or does not develop over time. Rather there is a stable percentage of the public strongly interested in the Presidential nominations. Twenty-two percent of

⁴Bush led Anderson by only 1,500 votes, receiving 31 percent to Anderson's 30.7 percent. Reagan led Anderson in Vermont by less than 700 votes.

⁵As the question asked people to name candidates running for the Republican nomination the drops in awareness of Baker, Connally and Anderson in Figure 1 are predictable. In each case they occurred after the candidates had abandoned their quest for the nomination.

the sample interviewed in October, 1979 said they were "very interested," as did 24 percent of those interviewed in February, 1980 and a comparable percentage of those interviewed in May, 1980.⁶

The final observation to be made from these data is that once the breakthrough in awareness accompanying heavy media coverage occurs, a ceiling is reached quite quickly. Despite increased attention given to Bush after Iowa, after the race had settled into a head-to-head contest between Reagan and Bush and after Bush finished first in the Pennsylvania and Michigan primaries, awareness of him did not increase through the primary period. The only deviation worth note in awareness of Bush comes with the Pennsylvania primary. As noted earlier, residents of Southern New Jersey received intense local television coverage of this event, while both regions of the state received national media coverage. The percentage of South Jersey residents aware of Bush went from 61 percent before the primary to 72 percent afterwards. The North Jersey figures were 59 percent before the primary and 57 percent afterwards. Thus while the national coverage and attention reproduced the stability we have grown accustomed to seeing, it appears that the intense local coverage did have some independent effects in making Bush better known.

As was generally the case with Bush, we did not observe any real increase in awareness of Anderson after New Hampshire. Reagan also reached a ceiling of awareness after his convincing victory in New Hampshire. After each quantum jump the candidates were playing on the margins. While we were initially predisposed to offer an explanation layering the public into strata of "attentives," "peripherals" and "inadvertents," each of which occurs at a different threshold, this explanation cannot account for the different levels at which awareness stabilized for the various candidates. Without more evidence all that can be presently concluded is that awareness of candidates does not build cummulatively over time.

⁶We can only approximate the May "interest" figures. In October and February a split-half design was employed on this question. Two independent probability samples were interviewed. Half were asked "how interested 'are you'..." , while half were asked "how interested 'have you been'..." In May the entire sample received the former wording. For a variety of reasons we believe the "have been" wording to be a more "truthful" indicator of interest. Figures for this wording were 22% "very interested" in October and 24 percent in February. Figures for the "how interested are you" wording were 33 percent in October, 31 percent in February and 32 percent in May. Based on these data we expect the May figures for the other wording would have been comparable.

While Republicans were slightly more aware of the candidates than were non-Republicans⁷, the pattern of Republican awareness was virtually identical to the data displayed in Figure 1. Where we might have expected to see more gradual learning by partisans based on a presumption of greater interest or salience, the observations noted above continued to hold.

An easier test of knowledge of the candidates is whether or not citizens are simply able to recognize their names. Candidates not mentioned in response to the open-ended "awareness" questions were presented to respondents who were asked "whether or not you have heard of them." While this is a second measure of "knowledge" there is no guarantee that recognition is based on knowledge of candidate-status. This is particularly true with Baker, who received wide exposure in the Senate Watergate hearings, and Connally, who may be recognized for a variety of previous activities--service in the Nixon administration, "milk-fraud" trial, switching of parties, or being wounded when President Kennedy was assassinated. The data for recognition are presented in Table 2, which displays the percentage able to recognize the candidates, and represents the data on awareness for comparison (as the percentage of those aware of the candidates).

The recognition patterns parallel the awareness patterns; although there is a ceiling effect with universal recognition occurring with the major jumps in awareness. This evidence does offer some support for the various strata hypothesized to exist earlier. The group able spontaneously to identify Reagan as a candidate stabilized at about 80 percent, Bush at about 60, and we suspect Anderson at about 50; although one more time point would have been necessary to confirm this. In addition to those aware of the candidates another 30 percent were able to recognize both Bush and Anderson; and this recognition must have come from campaign-related activities. Yet this third of the New Jersey population was unable to spontaneously recall these individuals as candidates.

In summary, awareness of candidates contesting the Republican nomination in 1980 occurred in jumps, predicated on primary successes and attending media coverage. Some evidence also exists to at least open the discussion of "stratas of awareness" with regard to less well known candidates (thus principally excluding Reagan). Simply running in primaries--without making a strong showing--seems to be sufficient to bring candidates to the attention

⁷The percentages for Republicans were only about five percent higher than the reported figures for the entire sample. In October the awareness figures were: Reagan, 52 percent; Connally, 34 percent; Baker, 29 percent; Bush, 11 percent; and Anderson 2 percent.

TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGES OF THOSE AWARE AND ABLE TO RECOGNIZE* CANDIDATES

	Oct 1979 <u>Pre-Iowa</u>	Feb 14-26 <u>Post-Iowa</u> <u>Pre-N.H.</u>	Feb 27-Mar 2 <u>Post-N.H.</u> <u>Pre-Mass.</u>	Mar 13-25 <u>Post-Mass.</u> <u>Pre-N.Y.</u>	Apr. 6-21 <u>Post-N.Y.</u> <u>Pre-Penn.</u>	Apr. 22-May 1 <u>Post-Penn.</u>	May 1-16 scattered <u>primaries</u>	May 16-22 <u>Pre-N.J.,</u> <u>Cal., Ohio</u>
<u>REAGAN</u>								
Aware	46	70	78	78	81	79	82	80
Recog.	99	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
Difference	53	29	21	21	18	20	17	18
<u>BUSH</u>								
Aware	8	53	62	59	59	60	62	57
Recog.	53	86	90	90	94	94	95	94
Difference	45	33	28	31	35	34	33	37
<u>ANDERSON</u>								
Aware	1	15	22	51	51			
Recog.	27	48	54	85	87			
Difference	26	33	32	34	30			
<u>CONNALLY</u>								
Aware	28	31	27					
Recog.	88	91	91					
Difference	60	60	64					
<u>BAKER</u>								
Aware	17	26	29					
Recog.	72	82	82					
Difference	55	56	53					

*Recognition is the percentage either spontaneously mentioning the candidate or able to recognize the candidate's name.

of about one-quarter of the (New Jersey) electorate. Over and above this, a strong primary showing appears to have a "hypodermic" effect, introducing the candidate--as a candidate--to another 30 to 40 percent of the electorate, as was the case with Bush and Anderson. Parallel to this in time, and on top of this strata, another third of the electorate gains a vague familiarity with the candidates. This group learns the names of the actors, perhaps passively learning by osmosis-through-exposure, without being able to spontaneously recall the context surrounding the name.

The Development of Opinions about the Candidates

Awareness is but the first step in the electorate's familiarization with the candidates. The second stage is one of opinion formation. The key questions here are: When do people form opinions of the candidates? And, what events explain this pattern?

Respondents who were able either to spontaneously recall the candidates or recognize their names were asked, "Is your general impression of him favorable or unfavorable; or don't you have an opinion about him?" The distribution of favorable versus unfavorable opinion is treated in the next section. The percentages of people not holding an opinion of each candidate over time are displayed in Figure 2. The number of cases on which the percentages are based vary by candidate (as well as time); as the proportion able to recognize the various candidates differed as described earlier. The n-sizes may be found in the Appendix.

The patterns shown in Figure 2 are remarkable for their stability. As was the case for awareness the candidates started at different levels--more offering opinions about Reagan than the others, with the fewest offering opinions of the lesser known Bush and Anderson. However, even as these candidates become better known through primary breakthroughs, and reach almost universal recognition, people feel no more comfortable forming opinions about them.


The proportion unable to offer an opinion about George Bush was highest (60 percent) in the October, 1979 survey, before his strong showing in Iowa. The post-Iowa--pre-New Hampshire measurement found 47 percent unable to offer an opinion. All other readings for Bush are between these extremes. The four readings on Howard Baker vary only between 47 and 58 percent; and the four measurements of John Connally find a similar range of about ten percentage points--between 34 and 44 percent unable to offer an opinion.

These findings also hold for the best known and least known candidates, Reagan and Anderson. The trend in the proportion unable to express an opinion about Reagan is stable and flat (between 23 and 34 percent), despite continual media coverage of Reagan's convincing primary victories on his way to the nomination. And, despite the increased news coverage accompanying the Massachusetts and Vermont primaries, we do not observe any more people forming impressions of John Anderson.

The only turbulation worthy of note in this sea of stability is the change over the last two time points. The proportion holding an opinion of Reagan increased by about 10 percent, while the Anderson percentage decreased a comparable amount. The intervening event most likely to explain these changes is the June 3

FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE NOT EXPRESSING OPINION ABOUT REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES

(All Respondents)



Oct 1979 Pre-Iowa Feb 14-26 Post-Iowa Pre-N.H. Feb 27-Mar 2 Post-N.H. Pre-Mass. Mar 13-25 Post-Mass. Pre-N.Y. Apr. 6-21 Post-N.Y. Pre-Penn. Apr 22-May 1 Post-Penn. May 1-16 scattered primaries May 16-22 Pre-N.J., Cal., Oh. June 23- July 11 Post-primary

"N"-sizes in appendix.

New Jersey primary. The jump in opinions about Reagan may be due to more heavy local media coverage and some spot advertising. The dropoff in the Anderson figures may represent increased uncertainty about him in the wake of Reagan's capturing over 80 percent of the popular vote.

While we thus see no learning effects over time, there are two factors that could mask such effects. First, given that the figures are computed on the percentages able to either mention or recognize the candidates, it may be that as the base of people increases due to the growth in recognition the composite figures are the average of two trends. Those aware of the candidates may be more able to offer opinions while those only able to recognize the candidates are less able to do so, masking real differences.

The evidence is that this is not the case, however. Those "aware" and those "recognizing" are segregated in Table 3. While as one would expect, fewer of those who had named them were unable to offer opinions about the candidates, the patterns are exactly the same. If graphed the awareness and recognition lines for each candidate would be parallel, as well as mostly straight. The same layering we observed on awareness holds for opinion formation. In general, about 15 percent more of those able to mention Reagan had formed opinions than of those only able to recognize him. The figures for Bush and Anderson average out to about 20 percent, with little individual deviation.

The second factor that could temper evidence of learning effects would be if Republican learning was masked by Democrats failing to learn about the Republican candidates. Figure 3 displays the pattern of opinion-holding for Republicans. The basic pattern is clearly isomorphic to that in Figure 2. The Republicans were slightly more likely to have opinions about their candidates--but not by much. And except for a few more "don't knows" about Bush after he had all but conceded to Reagan, the similarities rather than differences command attention.

The conclusion from this set of data may be stated starkly: Learning, insofar as it is reflected in the formation of opinions about candidates, did not take place over the course of the campaign. It may be that some people held "informed non-opinions"--that is they possessed information about the candidates that was pointed in no direction. But if information breeds either selectivity or pressure to form positions we would have expected to see greater movement across time. We suspect rather that people received information that was not particularly useful in helping them form opinions. The "horserace" style of media--and particularly television--coverage has been widely documented in previous elections, (Hofstetter, 1976; Patterson and McClure, 1976; Patterson, 1980) and appears to have been the dominant theme of the 1980 primaries (Robinson et al., 1980). With this bias of coverage about the only

TABLE 3: OPINION HOLDING BY FAMILIARITY WITH CANDIDATES
 Cell entries are percentages unable to offer an opinion.

	Oct 1979 <u>Pre-Iowa</u>	Feb 14-26 Post-Iowa <u>Pre-N.H.</u>	Feb 27-Mar 2 Post-N.H. <u>Pre-Mass.</u>	Mar 13-25 Post-Mass. <u>Pre-N.Y.</u>	Apr. 6-21 Post-N.Y. <u>Pre-Penn.</u>	Apr. 22-May 1 Post-Penn.	May 1-16 scattered primaries	May 16-22 Pre-N.J., Cal., Ohio
<u>REAGAN</u>								
% Aware	18	22	32	25	25	26	27	40
% Recog.	25	35	43	42	37	39	41	50
n Aware	515	1184	598	252	493	500	775	647
n Recog.	601	505	163	66	112	121	157	157
<u>BUSH</u>								
% Aware	52	38	50	45	45	42	42	47
% Recog.	62	62	72	63	63	58	62	67
n Aware	88	906	474	192	361	380	587	466
n Recog.	509	550	208	98	213	214	308	297
<u>ANDERSON</u>								
% Aware	*	35	43	45	40			
% Recog.	72	65	60	65	60			
n Aware	13	263	168	166	313			
n Recog.	288	569	239	109	219			


*Only 13 cases.

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information citizens (especially the great proportion reliant on television) may have been offered was the choice between forming opinions based on winning, as awareness is based on, or not being able to easily form impressions of the candidates.

This is hardly a comforting thought. Nor is there comfort to be found in the absolute percentages of opinion-holding from the final survey conducted after the June 3 primaries. That measurement found 55 percent saying they had not formed an impression of George Bush and 50 percent without an opinion of John Anderson. Twenty-two percent of those interviewed after the primary season ended had no clear feeling about Ronald Reagan, a drop of 11 percentage points from the last time point on Figure 3. We expect this difference is due to the intervening event of the New Jersey primary. The fact that so many can emerge from so lengthy a campaign with the vaguest of images about the principal actors leads to strong questions about the motivation of the public and the quality of information presented by the mass media.

FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE NOT EXPRESSING OPINION ABOUT REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES
(Republicans Only)



Oct 1979 Feb 14-26 Feb 27-Mar 2 Mar 13-25 Apr. 6-21 Apr 22-May 1 May 1-16 May 16-22
 Pre-Iowa Post-Iowa Post-N.H. Post-Mass. Post-N.Y. Post-Penn. scattered Pre-N.J.,
 Pre-N.H. Pre-Mass. Pre-N.Y. Pre-Penn. primaries Cal., Oh.

*Stopped campaign for Republican nomination. "N"-sizes in appendix.

Citizen Impressions of Candidates

We employed two questions to measure citizen attraction to candidates; one asked whether their overall impression of the candidate was "favorable or unfavorable" and the other asked which candidate they would "most like to see win" their party's nomination. The first question can be used to produce two different measures. One is the percentage of citizens offering a positive response of those who either mentioned or could recognize the candidate. The other is based on only those willing to offer an impression, and is the percentage having a favorable impression. Thus the base for the first measure is all of those asked for an opinion and includes "don't know," while the base for the second measure is only those actually offering a favorable or unfavorable opinion. In examining our data we have used both measures, simultaneously watching changes in the proportion of citizens who are willing to offer their impressions. Due to the stability of the propensity to rate candidates, discussed earlier, the two measures behave in nearly identical fashion. Consequently, "impression" as used here will mean the percentage of citizens with a favorable impression of the candidate based on those who were willing to offer an impression.

As we might expect, Republican candidates were better liked by Republicans than by Democrats, the notable exception to this being John Anderson, who was consistently more popular with Democrats. Yet for all candidates except Ronald Reagan, the differences in impression between Democrats and Republicans were not large. More significantly, the dynamics of citizen impressions were virtually identical for members of both parties. When plotted across time, the lines for Democrats and Republicans are parallel. The exception here was Reagan, whose case we will consider in detail. Otherwise, we will present data on citizen impressions of candidates for the entire sample, and not by party.

The parallel movement of Republicans and Democrats when evaluating Republican politicians suggests that under conditions of relatively scarce information, in which new faces are being introduced to the public, many of the perceptual defenses which we associate with the period of the general election are not operating. The stakes during the primaries are seen as low, and perhaps for those individuals not strongly bonded to their party identification, little cognitive strain occurs in coming to regard candidates in the other party more favorably. But the Reagan case illustrates the limits of this process. Reagan was the best-known Republican candidate, and most of our respondents (about three-fourths) expressed an opinion about him. Changes in the Democrats' impressions of Reagan paralleled those of Republicans up until the time of the New York primary. At that point, George Bush's chances of stopping Reagan appeared quite slim, and Gerald Ford, after a well-publicized testing with his toe, declared the


water too cold for him. The inevitability of Reagan's nomination stirred some Republicans to cast their lot with Bush, but on the whole, Reagan's popularity increased among Republicans. With Democrats, however, his popularity continued a slow decline, settling at 34 percent through the Pennsylvania primary and into May. It had been as high as 48 percent during the period right after his success in the New Hampshire primary.

Overall, the movement of citizen impressions of candidates suggests that success has a powerful influence on popularity. Failure to succeed results in declines in approval. For Bush and Anderson, the proportion of citizens with a positive impression rose over twenty percentage points from our October 1979 interviews to the post-Iowa/pre-New Hampshire segment. All other candidates suffered declines during this period. Figure 4 shows for all candidates the changes over time in the percentage of favorable impressions among those willing to judge. Iowa's importance in selecting two candidates from the field to receive further journalistic attention can hardly be overestimated. Iowa may not have killed Baker, Crane, Connally, and Dole, but the life breathed into the candidacies of Bush and Anderson eventually produced the same effect.

While Bush and Anderson realized similar gains, these occurred in different segments of the electorate. Iowa allowed Bush to expand from the attentives to the peripheral public, while Anderson did not fully reach this second level until after the Massachusetts and Vermont primaries. Reagan's failure to contest Iowa, and the fact that he received a lower vote than Bush at the caucus straw polls, lowered public impressions of him. His subsequent strong first place finish in New Hampshire returned him to his former level of approval, and resulted in declines in popularity of Anderson and Bush.

Although Anderson did not finish first in either Vermont or Massachusetts on March 4, his close second-place performances brought him substantial attention from journalists. Bush's first-place finish in Massachusetts was lost in the media's surprise over Anderson, and he continued to decline in popularity among our sample. Anderson, however, enjoyed an increase in favorable impressions of 10 percentage points. This reflected both changes in the impressions of some citizens and strong approval of others who were formerly unwilling or unable to rate him. Anderson had no more notable successes in the campaign, finishing second in his home state of Illinois, third in Connecticut, and third in Wisconsin, a progressive state with open primaries which might have been expected to give him more support. Although the proportion of our respondents with a favorable impression of Anderson remained quite high in absolute terms, it declined steadily from the high achieved after his performance on March 4.

FIGURE 4 : Proportion of citizens offering favorable impressions of the candidate, based on those willing to judge.




As suggested above, Reagan appeared to have a clear road to the nomination one month after the New Hampshire primary, over two months before the campaign would be officially over. The popularity of his chief opponent, Bush, had declined from its post-Iowa high of 78 percent to its October, 1979 level, 55 percent. Bush chose Pennsylvania as the place to make his last stand, and devoted considerable time and money there. With no other primaries to distract him, he spent several weeks in Pennsylvania. Figure 5 shows New Jersey citizen impression of Bush, divided according to region of residence. Although the pattern is not perfect, the data strongly suggest that southern Jersey residents, exposed to the Pennsylvania campaign (chiefly through local television), came to evaluate George Bush more favorably than did residents in the northern part of the state, whose only contact with the campaign came via national media. We have shown that Bush's salience increased in the southern half of the state, while remaining stable in the north. The data on the proportion favorable to Bush indicate that his campaign produced measurable change in attitudes of those exposed to it, even among citizens for whom the campaign was largely irrelevant. Bush's chance to get the nomination still seemed slight, and New Jersey residents would not have to face a choice on the matter for at least six weeks.

Bush received a slim majority of the vote in Pennsylvania, leading Reagan by 8 percentage points. True to our expectations, this well-publicized event resulted in sharp gains in favorable impressions for him, both among residents of north and south New Jersey. Significantly, the regional differences in opinions of Bush which had been established before the election, persisted in our May 1-15 segment, which was a complete probability sample, and had the second largest number of cases of any segment in the study. The only anomaly in these results is Bush's sharp increase in popularity in northern Jersey between our early and later May segments. No comparable change occurs in the south.

The other character in the Pennsylvania contest was Reagan, and inspection of his impression ratings for the two regions of New Jersey reveals considerable stability. The campaign and its results in Pennsylvania appear to have had no effect on his ratings in either region of New Jersey. Reagan's campaign in Pennsylvania was modest, as he found himself facing the prospect of empty coffers for the late primaries if he did not conserve.

Although our attention in this paper has been focused upon the Republican candidates, changes in the impression ratings of Edward Kennedy after the Pennsylvania primary lend support to the argument that exposure to news of a primary victory produces attitude change. Figure 5 shows respondents' impression ratings for Kennedy through the study period, divided according to region of residence. Although he began the campaign more popular in south

FIGURE 5 : Proportion of citizens offering favorable impressions of the candidate, based on those willing to judge, BY REGION OF RESIDENCE



Oct 1979 Pre-Iowa Feb 14-26 Post-Iowa Feb 27-Mar 2 Post-N.H. Mar 13-25 Post-Mass. Apr. 6-21 Post-N.Y. Apr 22-May 1 Post-Penn. May 1-16 scattered primaries May 16-22 Pre-N.J., Cal., Oh.

Jersey than north, this difference reversed after Kennedy's successes in Massachusetts and New York. After the Pennsylvania primary, favorable impressions of him rise for residents in the south, but not for those in the north. The change appears episodic, since the difference vanishes in interviews later in May. No effect of Kennedy's considerable efforts in Pennsylvania is apparent in the interviews conducted during the two weeks before the election, unlike the changes seen for George Bush. We should caution that opinions about Kennedy are necessarily better grounded than those of Bush, and this may help explain why favorable impressions about him change only in response to his primary success.

The Dynamics of Citizen Preference Among Candidates

Respondents identifying with or leaning towards a party were asked who they would most like to see win their party's nomination. Although they had earlier been asked to offer impressions of candidates in both parties, respondents were not offered a list of candidates when queried about their preference. The changes in preference over time parallel those in favorable impressions. Success in earlier tests makes candidates more popular, and more preferred, among citizens interviewed after those events. Figure 6 presents these data.


Our first measure of preference is the post-Iowa/pre-New Hampshire segment. At that time, Bush and Reagan were tied at 18 percent each. All other candidates were at 10 percent or under. Over one-third of Republicans said that they were undecided. Although we have no measure prior to the Iowa caucuses, national surveys indicate that Reagan's support had been much higher before that event. Louis Harris, using a slightly different question, found Reagan preferred by 44 percent of Republicans in late November of 1979. By contrast, Bush had 8 percent, a figure large enough to suggest that his organizational activities had already begun to attract the attention of some partisans.

Changes in preference for Bush and Reagan after New Hampshire provide no surprises. Bush declines until the time of the Pennsylvania primary, after which he rises to the level he achieved after Iowa. Reagan rises sharply in response to his success in New Hampshire, and continues increasing gradually until Pennsylvania. In the midst of these smooth changes, Gerald Ford jumps from 12 percent to 29 percent in the segment prior to the New York primary, and then returns to 12 percent in our pre-Pennsylvania segment. Accompanying his increase is an even larger decrease in the proportion who are undecided. We suspect that some of this change is due to sampling error, given the fact that the pre-New York segment included the fewest respondents in the study (93 Republicans). However, two circumstances suggest that all of the change is not artifactual. First, as we have argued earlier, Bush's failure to head off Reagan was apparent by this time, and Republican moderates were yearning publicly for some deliverance from the right wing. Second, Ford himself expressed the view that Reagan was a likely loser in the fall, and offered himself as a possible alternative. His statements were prominently covered, and conjecture about his candidacy remained in the news for several days as he awaited the verdict of party leaders. Although he announced on March 15 (three days after our pre-New York interviews had begun) that he would not run, many Republicans were still willing to volunteer his name when asked who they would most like to see win the nomination.

Bush's 10-point increase following the Pennsylvania primary

FIGURE 6 : Proportion of Republicans preferring each candidate.

P
E
R
C
E
N
T



Feb 14-26 Post-Iowa Pre-N.H.
 Feb 27-Mar 2 Post-N.H. Pre-Mass.
 Mar 13-25 Post-Mass. Pre-N.Y.
 Apr. 6-21 Post-N.Y. Pre-Penn.
 Apr 22-May 1 Post-Penn.

was his sharpest rise of the campaign. Examination of citizen preference divided according to region of residence in New Jersey would help to clarify the role of exposure to campaign information in the formation of preference. Unfortunately, the number of Republicans interviewed in southern New Jersey was quite small, numbering no more than 49 in any segment, and as few as 21. Although not shown here, we examined these results and they are generally supportive of arguments advanced with data on regional impressions of candidates. In particular, the proportion of partisans who are undecided falls in the south after the Pennsylvania primary, but not in the north. Changes in preference among Democrats followed this pattern as well, with Kennedy the beneficiary, as expected. Nevertheless, caution requires that we refrain from offering conclusions about the effects of the Pennsylvania media environment upon citizen preference.

DISCUSSION

These data have implications for a number of different audiences--those interested in the dynamics of public opinion, those interested in the role of the mass media, and those concerned with the biases of the process by which we select presidential nominees.

In looking at the interest of the public in presidential selection, we find evidence for the existence of strata which do not appear to change over time in response to events of the campaign. Knowledge of candidates and opinion-holding is distributed in layers of the public, which we have labelled "attentive," "peripheral," and "inadvertent." The attentives, perhaps one-fifth of the public, are aware of the candidates when the media first devote attention to the campaign, and knowledge is not dependent upon prominent coverage. The peripherals, about one-third, become aware only after exposure to the intense coverage accompanying success in a campaign test. Such coverage is also necessary to reach the inadvertents, perhaps another third of the public, although this group does not become aware of the candidates so much as they learn to recognize their names. The remainder of the public does not even reach this plateau of recognition and may be termed the "apathetic public." We see no evidence of the movement of large numbers of citizens from one status to another over the course of the campaign, although with independent samples this must necessarily remain an inference.

Changes in citizen impressions of candidates strongly support the old adage that "nothing succeeds like success." Many citizens base their evaluations of candidates upon perceptions of the candidate's competitive strength, rather than upon personal qualities or ideological positions. News about candidates' competitive positions dominates coverage of the nomination process, so it is not surprising that a portion of the citizenry uses this information in orienting itself toward the candidates. Because the major changes in public knowledge and impression of candidates occur early in the nomination process, media treatment of candidate performances in the early campaign tests exercises a strong influence over the ultimate outcome. Journalists offer clear cues to citizens in the prominence given to particular candidates and in setting expectations against which candidate performance is judged.

From their perspective, journalists' propensity to devote disproportionate attention to early campaign tests is quite rational. A consensus exists on the importance of the presidential selection process. Some elements of the process, such as the candidates' backgrounds and their efforts at building coalitions, provide few clear benchmarks for journalistic evaluations. Instead, the norm of objectivity leads journalists to focus on discrete events. At the time of the Iowa caucuses, no other events in the process compete for attention. Because it is the first opportunity for citizens to pass

judgment upon the candidates, it particularly suits journalists' notion of the divinity of direct democracy. Almost in celebration of the first word from the public, even the television networks' anchormen journey to the heartland. The technological imperatives of television also play a role in the rush to judgment. Electronic journalism is predicated on speed and pictures. The ability to have the news first, and the competitive tension among the networks, impels network news to broadcast events with an air of heightened immediacy. Such a practice provides strong cues of prominence. As a public, we have learned over time to equate immediacy with importance.

The significance attached to early campaign events, in light of their influence on the perceptions of other citizens, simultaneously supports and undermines the goals of the "new system." The system evolved in response to a desire for broader public participation in presidential nominations. The fundamental tenet was that each citizen would have an equal voice in selecting the party's nominee. Implicit was the notion that citizens would make informed choices. To some extent, these aims have been realized. The limited arena of conflict in small states like Iowa and New Hampshire facilitates intimacy between candidates and public. Candidates with limited resources are able to compete with those who are better known and better financed. In this fashion, the public is potentially offered a broader range of individuals (in background and experience) from which to choose.

Paradoxically, this benefit of a wider selection of candidates is achieved only at the cost of having a narrower electorate making preliminary decisions about the candidates. For with the early primaries comes a winnowing of the field, and voters in later primaries may be denied their choice of candidates who have not survived the earlier tests. To the extent that voters in Iowa and New Hampshire are atypical, the results cannot be considered representative of the nation as a whole. Further, the voters in early contests exert a substantial indirect effect on the choices of later voters by shaping their perceptions of the candidates. While the opinions of early voters may be based on considerable familiarity with the candidates, our evidence is that opinions of later voters (at least in New Jersey) are based as much upon the electoral fortunes of candidates in earlier contests as upon personal qualities or ideology.

A substantial portion of the public in New Jersey learned little about the candidates over the course of the campaign. Opinionation rose very little after the early contests. This is attributable both to a lack of interest by citizens, and to a lack of useful information from media. Journalistic preoccupation with the horserace informs the public about the candidates' wins and losses, and many citizens use this information as a basis of evaluation. Horse race coverage is understandable given the norm of objectivity and the tendency to focus on events. However, by covering these objective events with a false slaience (measured by the proportion of delegates selected in early primaries relative to the amount of coverage

accorded), objectivity in terms of the nomination process is in fact compromised.

Before concluding, several caveats must be noted. First, we are dealing with a primary election, and not a general election. While much of what we find may apply to general elections, we cannot know this. Second, our data are from one state, and may not be entirely generalizable due to the particular social and educational characteristics of the public in New Jersey. Additionally, while the late primary allowed us to follow public opinion about candidates through a long period in which the process did not impinge directly upon New Jersey residents, we can say little about how citizens respond to a campaign which is aimed directly at them. Third, only three elections have occurred in the "new system," and while regularities among them are apparent, the process is still evolving as participants learn the contingencies. Fourth, we do not attempt to generalize our findings to primary voters, so the electoral relevance of our findings must remain unspecified.

More generally, the magnitude of the findings must be considered. The dynamics which we observe, while significant in our opinion, involve relatively small portions of the public. The number of people who change their attitudes remains unknown. The use of a series of independent samples, rather than a panel design may underestimate change, but it also minimizes reactivity among our respondents, a considerable advantage in a study such as this one.

We also caution against an excessively mechanistic view of electoral dynamics that could be constructed from our findings. While we believe that the regularities we identify are real, and not artifactual, we do not wish to drain the politics from the process. George Bush was well-regarded not simply because he was successful, nor was John Connally's bad reputation a result of his dismal performance in the Iowa caucuses. While we see the consequences of candidates' success (or failure) in New Jersey, that success was based on more appropriate criteria applied by voters in Iowa and New Hampshire.

More than anything our findings attest to the interaction among citizen interest, candidate characteristics and the media environment. The relationship is a dynamic one. While each element has its independent boundaries, we suspect it is the mix peculiar to the nomination campaign that will allow us to make sense out of what happens and why. This paper has illuminated only a small part of this mixture. Much of interest and importance yet remains in the darkness.

APPENDIX:
RESULTS IN SELECTED REPUBLICAN PRIMARIES

	Anderson	Baker	Bush	Reagan
Puerto Rico 2/17		37	60	
New Hampshire 2/26	10	13	23	50
Massachusetts 3/4	31	5	31	29
Vermont 3/4	29	12	22	30
Illinois 3/18	37		11	48
Connecticut 3/25	22		39	34
Wisconsin 4/1	27		30	40
Pennsylvania 4/22			51	43

APPENDIX: N-SIZES FOR FIGURES

	Oct 1979 <u>Pre-Iowa</u>	Feb 14-26 <u>Post-Iowa</u> <u>Pre-N.H.</u>	Feb 27-Mar 2 <u>Post-N.H.</u> <u>Pre-Mass.</u>	Mar 13-25 <u>Post-Mass.</u> <u>Pre-N.Y.</u>	Apr. 6-21 <u>Post-N.Y.</u> <u>Pre-Penn.</u>	Apr. 22-May 1 <u>Post-Penn.</u>	May 1-16 <u>scattered</u> <u>primaries</u>	June 23- May 16-22 <u>Pre-N.J., Post-</u> <u>Cal., Ohio</u>	July 11 <u>Primary</u>
<u>Figure 2</u>									
Reagan	1123	1684	756	320	605	630	809	933	839
Bush	601	1463	680	291	574	598	776	885	805
Anderson	306	816	413	275	532	560	727	791	
Baker	816	1394	680	265					
Connally	998	1548	695	294					
<u>Figure 3</u>									
Reagan	353	571	212	95	186	198	345	244	
Bush	211	524	199	88	178	196	336	237	
Anderson	103	299	134	86	171				
Baker	280	501	192	86					
Connally	325	438	198	91					
<u>Figure 4</u>									
Anderson	90	355	163	139	246	427			
Baker	434	675	264						
Bush	241	770	298	141	271	318	469		
Connally	557	1012	391	177					
Crane	77	125							
Reagan	859	1242	497	225	437	436	657		
<u>Figure 5</u>									
Bush North	187	595	222	111	198	232	359		
Bush South	54	174	76	30	73	86	110		
Reagan North	672	943	380	176	328	335	511		
Reagan South	187	298	117	49	109	101	146		
Kennedy North	684	1025	447	200	362	377	587		
Kennedy South	204	327	132	51	120	108	167		
<u>Figure 6</u>									
Republicans		189	216	93	186	193			

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